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Policy debate with regard to financial intermediaries has focused on whether, and to what extent, 
governments should impose capital adequacy requirements on banks, or alternately, whether 
market forces could also ensure the stability of banking systems. The paper contributes to this 
debate by showing how market forces may motivate banks to select high capital adequacy ratios 
as a means of lowering their borrowing costs. If the effect of competition among banks is strong, 
then it may overcome the tendency for bank capitalisation that arises from systemic effects. If 
systemic effects are strong, regulation is required. Empirical tests for the Indian public sector 
banks during the 1990s demonstrate that better capitalised banks experienced lower borrowing 
costs. These findings suggest that ongoing reform efforts at the international level should 
primarily focus on increasing transparency and strengthening competition among banks. 
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Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, authorities from G-10 and other emerging economies have been 
engaged in regulatory reforms in their banking sector. The aim of such activity, a large part of 
which concentrates on bank capital adequacy ratios, has been to mitigate bank solvency 
problems. The motivation behind the proliferation of regulatory activity has been based on the 
presumption that the banks, if left alone, might remain undercapitalised relative to the socially 
optimal level.  
The present paper explicitly evaluates the validity of the presumption. Towards this end, 
an analytical framework is developed to examine how banks select their capital adequacy ratios. 
The model seeks to explain why and how competition among banks can support high capital 
adequacy ratios. It suggests that ‘market discipline’ (competitive forces) can assist the 
implementation of capital adequacy regulations. The empirical evidence on the results pertaining 
to public sector banks in India during the 1990s shows that better capitalised banks experienced 
lower borrowing costs.  
It is possible to draw two major conclusions from these findings. First, capital adequacy 
regulation may be socially desirable. And second, regulation aimed at creating and sustaining 
competition among banks, notably through increased transparency, can play an important role in 
mitigating bank solvency problems.  
 
I. Why Capital Adequacy Requirements? 
Government regulation is usually needed in the presence of market failures emanating 
from public goods, externalities, monopolies or information asymmetries between buyers and 
sellers. In case of banks, regulation is justified on the ground that depositors are unable to monitor 
the financial soundness of banks (asymmetric information) and that there is a risk of systemic 
crisis (which can engender bank runs).  
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Dewartipont and Tirole (1993a, 1993b), and Miles (1995) have argued that if depositors 
could effectively monitor the banks, this would limit socially sub-optimal bank behaviour. But 
monitoring is expensive and there are limits to information. Moreover, bank debt is held mainly 
by depositors, who account for the majority of deposits and given explicit deposit insurance, as is 
prevalent in most countries including India, lack the incentives to perform efficient monitoring. 
Thus, depositors need to be represented by a regulator who can intervene on their behalf to 
correct market failure. 
Several possibilities have been proposed in the literature for prevention of bank runs. 
Salient among these include banks that invest only in riskless securities, funding banks with 
equity rather than demand deposits, and offering Government deposit insurance. Although these 
proposals may insulate banks from runs, they have drawbacks since some of them can lead to 
moral hazard, as is the case of the lender of last resort and deposit insurance.  
Requiring banks to increase their capital seems to be an plausible regulatory response to 
the risk of a systemic crisis which additionally can improve the soundness and safety of the 
banking sector. The requirements that compel banks to hold sufficient capital may alter their 
attitudes towards risk. Illustratively, when a bank holds a large amount of equity capital, the bank 
has more to lose if it fails, and is consequently more likely to pursue less risky activities. 
This argument has, however, not been without its critics. Benston and Kaufman (1996) 
and Dowd (2000) have disputed these arguments. They have, instead, argued that capital 
adequacy regulation is both unnecessary and incapable of improving banks' capital position more 
than the banks could do on their own. In Dowd's (2000) view, shareholders can enforce proper 
risk behaviour. Moreover, both studies note that the best argument for capital adequacy regulation 
is that it might help to counter the effects of other given interventions such as the moral hazard 
created by the regulatory authorities themselves. 
Analysts of domestic and international banking regulation have resorted to market 
pressure arguments to account for this observation. Those studying domestic banking sectors 
have argued that banks experience opportunity costs and may face reduced profits when they 
increase capital adequacy ratios. Moreover, if these reasons were not enough to motivate minimal 
compliance or non-compliance with capital adequacy regulations, the existing ‘safety net’ should 
do so (Avery and Berger, 1991; Wall and Peterson, 1995; BCBS, 1999). The fact, however, that 
banks, on average, have capital adequacy ratios well above the regulatory minimum is not 
compatible with these assertions.  
On the other hand, observers of international banking regulation have argued that, since 
capital adequacy regulations impose substantial costs on banks, preferences and behaviour of 
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both regulators and banks are shaped by ‘level playing field’ considerations. Yet, if compliance 
with capital adequacy regulations were very costly and therefore impinge upon the 
competitiveness of banks, as many authors have claimed (Wagster, 1996; Oatley and Nabors, 
1998), the question remains as to why there exists large cross-national differences in capital 
ratios. A related issue of import is why would capital ratios for banks exceed the minimum 
required. If the regulatory process were strongly driven by ‘level playing field’ concerns, it is 
most likely to have resulted in convergence of capital adequacy across and within countries 
around the minimum Basel standards. 
Some authors have drawn attention to market pressure as an explanation for the rapid 
acceptance and diffusion of the Basel capital adequacy standards (Genschel and Plümper, 1996). 
Their contention is that these standards have increased transparency, thereby enabling financial 
markets to ‘punish’ poorly capitalized banks and rewarding banking systems with higher capital 
levels. Rating agencies are hypothesized to have been instrumental in promoting national and 
international capital adequacy regulations and driving up the overall capital adequacy ratio. While 
this argument is prima facie plausible and may explain high than stipulated capital ratios, it is 
insufficiently specified and has not received any empirical confirmation in the literature.  
Other studies suggest that capital adequacy ratios have an impact on banks' funding costs. 
Keeley (1990), based on a sample of 77 U.S. bank holding companies from 1984 to 1986, finds 
that banks paid an interest rate premium on uninsured deposits (those greater than $100,000) that 
was related to banks' default risk. The study concludes that a 1 percent increase in banks' capital 
ratio lowered their rate on certificates of deposit (CD) by 14 basis points, and that a 1 percent 
increase in banks' market-to-book asset ratio (an indicator for market power) reduced the average 
CD cost by 16-18 basis points.2 Finally, Madura and Zarruk (1993) argue that share prices of U.S. 
banks with lower capital adequacy ratios were more negatively affected by the introduction of 
uniform capital requirements in 1987 and 1988 than banks with higher capital adequacy ratios. In 
summary, the above mentioned studies on market discipline suggest that banks with higher 
capital ratios may be rewarded by markets with lower funding costs, which motivates banks to 
exceed minimum capital adequacy ratio requirements set by regulators. 
Most of these studies pertain to the U.S. banking industry. Exceptions to this are Nachane 
(1999), Ghosh et al. (2003), Rime (2001) and Nachane et al. (2005). Thus, Ghosh et al (2003) 
formulate a dynamic multivariate panel regression model where the independent variables 
include, among others, a dummy variable for regulatory pressure. The findings suggest that (a) 
capital regulation is effective in the sense that they influence bank behaviour and (b) the 
regulatory framework needs to be designed to encourage individual banks to maintain higher 
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capital ratios than the stipulated minimum, in order to reflect their differential risk profiles. Rime 
(2001), on the other hand, notes that Swiss banks holding large capital buffers beyond the 
regulatory minimum may have been driven by market considerations, such as volatility of capital, 
liquidity of markets for bank stocks, access to capital markets and the cost of raising capital.  
The present paper makes an attempt has been made to examine whether market forces 
can act as a substitute for capital adequacy requirements by explicitly considering both market 
forces (interest rate on deposits) and Government intervention (deposit insurance). 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
The banks in the model are entities that intermediate funds between lenders (depositors) 
and borrowers. They make loans, at exogenously given interest rates, and finance them with 
deposit and own capital. Each bank selects the interest rate it offers on its deposits in order to 
maximize profits. For purposes of tractability, it is assumed that all banks are identical. As a 
starting point, we first discuss a benchmark case in which banks operate without any restrictions 
on borrowing and lending activities and subsequently introduce Government deposit insurance.  
What role does bank capital play in this environment? First, bank capital is a direct 
source of funding for loans. Second and more importantly, capital matters for the perceived 
riskiness of bank deposits. An undercapitalised bank is more likely to turn insolvent in the face of 
adverse developments on the asset side of its balance sheet than a sufficiently capitalized one. If 
deposits are less than fully insured, bank failure inflicts losses on the depositors. Banks with 
higher capital adequacy ratios are, consequently, perceived as safer managers of borrowed funds 
and will be able to attract deposits on more favourable terms (lower rates) than inadequately 
capitalized banks. A bank can use its capital adequacy ratio as a means of establishing a cost 
advantage against its competitors. At the same time, an individual bank's interest rate depends 
also on the perceived safety of the banking system as a whole (systemic risk). A highly 
capitalized banking industry makes bank deposits relatively safer in comparison to other 
investments (from the investor-depositor's point of view), thereby exerting positive externalities 
on all banks. When an individual bank selects its preferred level of capital, it takes into account 
the fact that the more its own capital increases, the greater is the relative attractiveness of its 
deposits vis-à-vis competing banks (substitution effect). From a micro standpoint, this behaviour 
on the part of an individual bank typically ignores the fact that the higher capital level also 
contributes to the overall safety of the banking system (the systemic effect), lowering risk premia 
on deposit rates across the board. Such lack of internalization of spillover effects is quite common 
in markets characterised by externalities.  
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The profits (Π) of an individual bank are given by equation (1) 
 
Π = RL L – RD(k-k*, k*)*q – c(k)                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where RL and RD are the loan and deposit interest rates, k is the level of own capital, k* is the 
average capital level of the banking sector, L and q are the quantum of loans and deposits, 
respectively and c is the cost of raising own capital (where δc/δk>0 and δ2c/δk2>0). We assume, 
purely for tractability, that the quantity of deposits received by each bank is fixed.3 Furthermore, 
it is assumed that: 
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The first two inequalities indicate that if a bank selects a higher capital adequacy ratio, 
then it can lower its funding cost (but at a decreasing rate). The third inequality states that a 
uniform (across banks) increase in the capital adequacy ratio reduces the borrowing cost of all 
banks (lower systemic risk).  
The significance of the last inequality stems from the fact that it examines the cost impact 
on individual bank's borrowing when competitors increase their capital, while the bank’s own 
capital position is unaltered. A negative sign on this variable indicates that an individual bank can 
‘free-ride’ on the healthiness of other banks: the benefits from a reduction in systemic risk more 
than offset the losses from the increase in relative riskiness (the general effect dominates the 
substitution effect). If, on the other hand, the sign is positive, then a bank loses (the substitution 
effect dominates the general effect).  
Finally, the balance sheet constraint dictates that: 
L = k+q                                                                                                                             (3) 
The choice variable of the bank is the level of own capital (or equivalently, given the 
fixity of q, the capital adequacy ratio). Following from (1), the first order condition for profit 
maximization, after invoking (3), is given by (4). 
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In a symmetric equilibrium, k* = k. The optimal level of k, (say kP) is given by (4). In 
other words, the bank builds capital up to the point where the marginal cost of loan equals the 
marginal benefit. The benefit is composed of two elements: the increase in lending capacity 
consequent upon the reduction in funding costs, and the reduction in borrowing costs. 
Having examined the individual bank’s profit maximisation, it is important to examine 
the industry’s maximization problem. The inclusion of k* in the R(.) function implies an 
 7
externality: the individual bank's choice of a capital adequacy ratio has implications for the level 
of systemic risk for the banking sector as a whole. This externality was not internalized in the 
decision-making process of the individual bank. Therefore, for a social planner, the choice of 
capital would need to explicitly incorporate the externality that higher capital position for 
individual banks would raise the overall capital position of the banking industry as well. 
Accordingly, the socially optimal level of capital, say kS, is given by the solution to the following 
equation:  
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A comparison of (4) and (5) reveals that a bank is undercapitalised relative to the 
society's preferred level (kP<kS) if ∂RD/∂k*<0. In this case, there is a ‘free-riding’ problem as the 
positive spillover from a reduction in systemic risk outweighs any losses arising from 
deterioration in the bank's relative position. If, on the other hand, ∂RD/∂k* > 0, then a bank cannot 
rely on other banks' higher capitalization in order to bring its borrowing costs down. On the 
contrary, if the other banks strengthen their capital position and she does not follow suit then she 
has to pay higher rates on deposits to compensate her depositors for the higher relative risk they 
face. 
The immediate question of relevance is: the determinants of the sign on ∂RD/∂k*. When 
an individual decides on opening a bank account, two immediate decisions assume importance. 
First, whether to place the money in a bank account vis-à-vis a competing non-bank asset. 
Second, assuming bank deposit to be the preferred choice, which one of the banks to select for 
opening a deposit account? While systemic risk in the banking sector plays an important role in 
the first decision, it is individual (idiosyncratic) bank risk that tends to be a dominant concern in 
case of the second. If the depositors are more concerned about the first decision than about the 
second, then ∂RD/∂k* is likely to be negative. Investors consider deposits offered by different 
banks that differ in terms of capital adequacy ratios as close substitutes. In this case, a bank will 
not have a strong incentive to select a high capital adequacy ratio to distinguish itself from its 
competitors. As a result, banks will tend to choose low levels of capital relative to the socially 
optimal level. Banks rely on other banks to keep their borrowing cost low. 
If, on the other hand, depositors care more about idiosyncratic than about systemic bank 
risk, then capital adequacy ratio can be a powerful instrument for improving relative bank 
attractiveness and gaining a cost advantage over its rivals. In this case, ∂RD/∂k*>0 and 
competition among banks will drive capital adequacy ratios upward, perhaps to levels that exceed 
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the socially optimal level, removing the need for Government mandated minimum capital 
requirements.  
 
Deposit Insurance 
The earlier discussion would suggest that deposit insurance is a source of externality and 
may engender a moral hazard problem. The maximization problem faced by the individual bank 
with deposit insurance is given by (6) 
 
)()(*)*,()( kcmRmqkkkRqkR IDL −−−−−+=Π                                                            (6) 
 
where m is the fraction of deposits that are insured, q-m those that are uninsured4  and RI is the 
interest rate offered on insured deposits (which, in equilibrium, must be the same for all banks). 
The first order condition for profit maximization is given by (7): 
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Comparison of (4) and (7) reveals that the capital adequacy ratio selected in the presence 
of partial deposit insurance falls short of that selected without deposit insurance. In other words, 
the incentive on the part of banks in the presence of deposit insurance to improve the relative 
safety of their deposits is lower than otherwise. 
The social planner needs to internalize these two externalities - the one pertaining to 
systemic risk and the one associated with Government provided deposit insurance - when 
selecting the socially optimal capital adequacy ratio of banks. Assume that the function L(k) 
denotes the social cost resulting from expected bank failures, then the function that evaluates the 
contribution of any bank's actions to social welfare takes the form as given by (8), i.e.,  
)()()(*)*,()( kLkcmRmqkkkRqkR IDL −−−−−−+=Π                                             (8) 
 
where, ∂L(.)/∂k < 0, that is, the more capitalized the bank the less likely it will fail and the less 
likely that insurance payments will be made. The maximization of (8) produces the socially 
optimal level of bank capital, kS 
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As in the case without deposit insurance, the sign of ∂RD/∂k* plays a critical role in 
determining whether competition among banks can be an efficient alternative to Government 
mandated capital adequacy regulations. It must be noted, though, that the probability of an 
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undercapitalised banking system is higher because of the presence of the last term in (9). The 
social planner would prefer banks to hold sufficient capital in order to reduce the occurrence of 
bank failures. The banks, however, fail to internalize this social loss while selecting their capital 
adequacy ratios.6 
 
III. Empirical Specification 
The present section examines whether the borrowing costs of banks are affected by 
idiosyncratic and industry-wide capital adequacy ratios. A plot of stipulated and actual capital 
adequacy ratios of public sector banks in India since the mid 1990s clearly demonstrates that 
capital adequacy ratios that exceed the stipulated requirements (Chart 1).  
Chart I: Actual and Stipulated CRAR of Commercial Banks-
1996 to 2003
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Following from (9), the empirical strategy comprises of estimating the following 
reduced-form specification as given by (10)5: 
 
itittititti uxakakkaR +++−= 3*2*1, )(                                                                                     (10) 
where Rit measures the funding cost of bank i in period t; kit is that bank's capital 
adequacy ratio; k*t is the average capital adequacy ratio of the bank group; and xit is a vector of 
bank-specific control variables. Economically, if a1 is negative (and statistically significant), a 
bank can lower its funding costs by increasing its capital adequacy ratio. And secondly, if a2 is 
non-negative, bank competition can help to reduce the free-riding problem.  
Towards this end, in the first step, we estimate the following baseline specification 
(without the average capital adequacy ratio):  
itititti uxwkwR ++= 21,                                                                                                         (11) 
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Specifically, we test whether w1 <0. If this hypothesis is rejected, this indicates that an 
individual bank cannot reduce its borrowing costs by raising its capital adequacy ratio. 
Consequently, the hypothesis that market forces may drive capital ratios upwards has limited 
relevance from an empirical standpoint.  
The data set consists of yearly observations on the Indian public sector banks for the 
period 1996 through 2003, the highest periodicity with which data on the concerned variables is 
available on a consistent basis. Owing to lack detailed information on interest rates offered by 
each bank on the various types of deposits, in consonance with the literature, the implicit cost of 
deposits has been employed. Accordingly, the variable Rit is measured in terms of the implicit 
cost of deposits (COST), defined as the ratio of interest expended on deposits by the bank to its 
total deposits (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001). The variable kit is Tier-1ratio (Tier-1 capital 
divided by total risk weighted assets); xit denotes a vector of bank-specific control variables 
which include the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) and other bank-specific characteristics 
- return on equity (RoE), non-performing loan to total asset (NPA) and off-balance sheet 
activities to total asset (OBS). We also include quadratic terms in the regressions to capture 
possible non-linearities in the relationship underlying bank capital adequacy and borrowing cost. 
The summary statistics for the data employed in the regression in Table 1. Table 2 (column 2) 
reports the estimation results without control variables, whereas Table 2 (column 3) includes 
control variables. 
The results, reported in Table 2 (column 2), indicate that well capitalized banks face 
lower average interest expenses on their deposits. This finding validates an important premise of 
the model, viz., that market forces influence banks' choices of individual capital adequacy ratios. 
Moreover, this function is convex: the coefficient for the quadratic term, ki
2, is positive. This 
suggests that while additional capital lowers borrowing costs, it does so at a decreasing rate. 
Well-capitalized banks benefit less than inadequately capitalised banks when they increase their 
capital adequacy ratios. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Regression 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum  Maximum  
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COST 7.154 0.62 4.598 9.348 
Tier 1 6.397 4.739 -18.810 18.457 
SIZE 9.613 0.912 7.531 12.761 
RoE 1.264 6.349 -3.553 32.127 
OBS 24.580 12.061 2.516 73.032 
NPA 6.866 2.790 2.105 17.273 
 
Additionally, when the control variables are introduced, the results (Table 2 - column 3) 
indicate that banks with higher return on equity encounter lower borrowing costs. On the other 
hand, banks with a larger non-performing assets face higher interest expense ratios. The latter 
finding provides additional evidence that depositors are concerned about the riskiness of their 
investments. Banks that are perceived as riskier  because they hold larger amounts of non-
performing loans are ‘punished’ by the market with higher borrowing costs (Ghosh and Das, 
2003; see also, Yeyati et al., 2004 for evidence for emerging markets). And finally, banks, which 
have greater fee-based income, as reflected in higher off-balance sheet activity, are perceived to 
be well diversified and consequently, face lower borrowing cost. Bank size, as measured by total 
assets has limited relevance for banks cost of borrowings.  
 
Table 2: Market Discipline and Capital Adequacy: Preliminary Results 
Dependent Variable: Implicit Deposit Interest Rate 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 7.371 (0.069)*** 8.294 (0.894)* 
ki -0.027 (0.009)* -0.081 (0.010)* 
ki
2 -0.0007 (0.006) 0.0003 (0.0006) 
Control variables   
SIZE  -0.091 (0.086) 
RoE  -0.007 (0.001)* 
NPA  0.061 (0.022)* 
OBS  -0.015 (0.003)* 
Diagnostics   
No of bank-year observations 216 216 
R-square 0.13 0.21 
Time period 1996-2003 1996-2003 
Standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
The elasticity6 of the interest rate with regard to the capital adequacy ratio is around 0.1. 
In other words, an increase in the capital adequacy ratio by 10 per cent lowers the average interest 
rate paid on bank deposits by about 1 per cent. In other words, there is a significant effect of 
capital adequacy ratios on borrowing costs. 
The aforesaid results suggest that competition among banks contributes to higher levels 
of bank capitalization. However, to examine the basic premise: ‘does the desire to lower 
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borrowing costs is strong enough to override the tendency for undercapitalisation that arises from 
free riding and moral hazard’, we estimate the original specification (equation 10):  
ititttitti uxwkakkaR +++−= *2*1, )(     
where kt* is the average capital adequacy ratio at time t. Table 3 reports the results. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Market Discipline and Capital Adequacy:  
Adjusting for Average Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Implicit Deposit Interest Rate 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Constant 8.621* 0.872 
(ki-k*) -0.038** 0.010 
k* -0.151* 0.060 
(k*)2 0.009* 0.003 
Log (Asset) -0.109 0.101 
RoE 0.0004 0.001 
NPA 0.053* 0.022 
OBS -0.014* 0.004 
No of bank-year observations 216  
R-square 0.36  
Time period 1996-2003  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
The coefficients for variables (ki- k*) and k*, respectively, are statistically significant and 
negative. This result implies that provided a bank increases its capital adequacy ratio relative to 
the average, it is able to reduce its borrowing costs. On the other hand, an increase in the 
industry-wide capital adequacy ratio, holding individual bank capital constant also reduces the 
bank's borrowing costs. Given that the (absolute value of) coefficient for the average capital 
adequacy ratio, k* far exceeds that for the individual capital adequacy ratio (ki - k*), the latter 
effect dominates. In other words, competition among banks is by itself not sufficient to eliminate 
the free-rider problem. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The present analysis demonstrates that competitive forces may, in principle, motivate 
banks to select high capital adequacy ratios as a means of lowering their borrowing costs. If the 
effect of competition among banks is strong, then it may enable to overcome the tendency for 
bank undercapitalisation that arises from systemic effects. If such systemic effects are strong, 
capital adequacy regulation assumes prominence.  
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To understand the behaviour of market discipline on capital adequacy, we examined the 
behaviour of Indian public sector banks in the 1990s. Two main findings emerged. Better-
capitalised banks experienced lower borrowing costs. Second, bank competition could not have 
substituted for capital adequacy regulation because of substantial systemic effects (free riding). 
These findings offer a plausible explanation for the observed over-compliance with stipulated 
capital adequacy requirements. In other words, over-compliance may have been driven by the fact 
that competition motivates banks to select higher capital adequacy ratios than otherwise. The 
ongoing progress towards adoption of Basel II with its focus on risk sensitive capital 
requirements and market discipline through greater transparency are efforts in this direction. 
Clearly, this would need to be tempered with country-specific considerations since the structure 
of the banking industry varies markedly across countries (Reddy, 2004). 
 
References 
 
Avery, R.B. and A.N.Berger (1991). ‘Risk-based Capital and Deposit Insurance Reform’, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 15: 847-874. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). ‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: 
The Impact of the Basel Accord’, Working Paper No.1, BIS: Basel. 
 
Benston, G. and G.Kaufman (1996). ‘The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation’, Economic 
Journal, 106: 688-697. 
 
Berger, A.N., R.J.Herring and G.P.Szego (1995). ‘The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions’, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 19:393-430. 
 
Dewartipont, M. and J.Tirole (1993a). The Prudential Regulation of Banks. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
 
---- (1993b). ‘Efficient Governance Structure: Implications for Banking Regulation, in C.Mayer 
and X.Vives (eds.) Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Diamond, D.W and P.H.Dybvig (1993). ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity’, Journal 
of Political Economy, 91:401-419. 
 
Dowd, K. (2000). ‘Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance’, Journal of Financial 
Services Research, 17: 7-15. 
 
Genschel, P and T.Plumper (1997). ‘Regulatory Competition and International Cooperation’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 4: 626-642. 
 
 14
Ghosh, S. D.M.Nachane, A.Narain and S.Sahoo (2003). ‘Capital Requirements and Bank 
Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Public Sector Banks’, Journal of 
International Development, 15: 43-54. 
 
Ghosh, S. and A. Das (2003). ‘Market Discipline in Indian Banking: An Empirical Exploration’, 
NSE Research Initiative No. 82, NSE: Mumbai. 
 
Keeley, M.C. (1990). ‘Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking’, American 
Economic Review, 80:1183-1200. 
 
Madura, J and E.R.Zarruk (1993). ‘Market Reaction to Uniform Capital Adequacy Guidelines in 
the Banking Industry’, Journal of Economics and Finance, 17: 59-72. 
 
Martinez Peria, M.S. and S.Schmukler [2001]. Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behaviour: 
Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises. Journal of Finance. 56, 
pp.1029-1051. 
 
Miles, D (1995). ‘Optimal Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Intermediaries’, European 
Economic Review, 39: 1365-1384. 
 
Nachane, D.M. (1999), ‘Capital Adequacy Ratios: An Agnostic Viewpoint’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, January Special Nos. 3&4 on Money, Banking and Finance, 155-160,  
 
Nachane, D.M., P.Ray and S.Ghosh, ‘The New Basel Capital Accord: Rationale, Design and 
Tentative Implications for India’, INDIA Development Report (forthcoming).  
 
Oatley, T and R.Nabors (1998). ‘Redistribute Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers and 
the Basel Accord, International Organisation, 52: 35-54. 
 
Rime, B (2001). ‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: Empirical Evidence for 
Switzerland’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 25: 143-159. 
 
Reddy, Y.V. (2004), ‘Banking Sector in Global Perspective’, Inaugural Address at the Bankers 
Conference, New Delhi.  
 
Santos, J.A.C. (2000). ‘Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of 
the Literature’, Working Paper No. 90, BIS: Basel. 
 
Wagster, J.D (1996). ‘Impact of the 1988 Basel Accord on International Banks’, Journal of 
Finance, 51: 1321-1346. 
 
Wall, L.D and D.R.Peterson (1995). ‘Bank Holding Company Targets in the Early 1990s: The 
Regulators versus the Markets’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 19: 563-574. 
 
Yeyati, E.L., M.Soledad Martinez Peria and S.Schmukler (2004), ‘Market Discipline under 
Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3440, Washington DC.  
 
 
 
 15
Endnotes 
 
1. The views expressed and the approach pursued in the paper reflects the personal views of the 
authors. 
 
2. Keeley (1990) also claims that banks with high capital adequacy ratios have a lower default 
probability and a lower incentive to increase asset risk and thus should pay lower rates for 
certificates of deposit (CD). 
 
3. We could alternatively assume q=q (k), with q’(.)>0, without affecting the qualitative 
properties of the model. 
 
4. This specification is based on Indian practice. The Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee 
Corporation insures individual deposits up to Rs.1 lakh. 
 
5. Consider a simple parametric example to highlight the main results. Assume 
R(k-k*, k*) = ao - a1(k-k*) -a2 k* 
c(k)=k2/2 and L(k) = bo – b1nmk 
 
where a1 and a2 are related to depositors’ evaluation of idiosyncratic and systemic bank risk, 
respectively and n is the number of banks.  
Using the aforesaid specification and that in a symmetric equilibrium, k=k*, (7) and (9) can be 
written as: 
kP = RL + (q-m)*a1                   
kS = RL + (q-m)*a1 – (q-m)*(a1-a2)+b1nm 
A necessary condition for banks to hold capital at least as much as social planners would require 
is that depositors care about idiosyncratic risk more than systemic bank risk (i.e., a1>a2). A 
sufficient condition is that [b1nm – (q-m)*(a1-a2)]<0 or equivalently, (a1-a2)>[(b1nm)/(q-m)]. In 
other words, depositors concern about idiosyncratic risk vis-à-vis systemic risk must exceed a 
threshold limit.  
 
 
6. In the theoretical model, banks were assumed to be identical. As a result, they ended up 
selecting the same capital adequacy ratio and paying the same interest rate on deposits. It is 
straightforward to allow for differences across banks (for instance, in the c function). This would 
produce a non-degenerate distribution of capital adequacy ratios and interest rates and would 
hence justify the use of this regression specification. 
 
7. Given the form of the regression equation, R = b1*k1+ b2*ki
2, the elasticity (e) is defined as  
e = (b1+b2*ki)*(ki/Ri). Using the values of the estimated coefficients b1 and b2 at the mean values 
of k and R (k =6.4 and R =0.0.071) results in e = - 0.08. 
